Introduction
Few people over the age of sixty can remember the circumstances that led from Belgian colonial rule over the Congo to the military dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. The fateful confrontation between King Boudewijn and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba has been forgotten. Columns of mercenary soldiers speeding toward Stanleyville (presently Kisangani) to rescue Europeans and punish leftist African guerrillas only exist in the pages of the potboiler novels that one finds in airport terminals. The televised assault 201 of Lumumba and members of his cabinet has become 'exotic' footage for late night television. The stoic face of Joseph Kasabuvu and the more bemused one of Moise Tshombe no longer remind us of what might have been if the fickle Congolese had simply let the NATO powers tell them how to be 'independent'. The cartoon character Tintin, one of the most unvarnished icons of Belgian colonialism, no longer informs Congolese schoolchildren that Belgium is their fatherland, but asks them to recite addition facts' 3 '. Scenes of Mobutu surrounded by his soldiers or vigorously shaking hands with some foreign emissary have lost their value as Cold War propaganda now that he is dead. Hardly anyone cares to remember more than a few images of "le pari congolais", the 'Congolese gamble' (4) .
The overthrow of the Mobutu dictatorship by a coalition of forces under Laurent Kabila two years ago, and the present lukewarm rebellion against Kabila's government, have forced many people to revisit the events surrounding Belgium's hold on the Congo and its tragic demise. Who initiated the struggle for independence -the generality of Africans or the handful of relatively privileged African évolués who served the colonial administration and the private companies? Did armies of communist agitators adroitly negotiate the footpaths of the Congo's rain forest to whip up discontent, or did local people, sustained by a belief that their grievances exceeded the capacities of the existing political order, bring down the colonial edifice (5) ?
Whenever the popular classes of any country declare their aspirations, they also reveal some of the harsh experiences they have withstood.
In so doing, they give us a brief glimpse of how and what they remember of the past and how they construct their own 'archeology of knowledge'* 6 '. What they remember may actually coincide with a set of conventional relationships expressed in conventional termsthe 'facts' of the professional historian -but its arrangement and packaging may be disconcerting for those who live on the other side of the social divide <7) . The state may also determine that such forms of remembrance are subversive and therefore subject to censure, although it may also take comfort in them, believing them to be relatively harmless however disturbing their mode of presentation may be' 8 '.
But why should popular forms of remembrance be thought of as disconcerting -and, under certain conditions, subversive -particularly if they are too parochial to engender universal pangs of conscience? Such remembrance is disconcerting because it suggests that the deference displayed by the lower classes in their daily interaction with their social betters might be a kind of charade animated by material necessity rather than a set of shared assumptions about how life should be; that the only thing that prevents the lower classes from acting out their version of the 'social dream' is the power of the state's weapons rather than the belief that the material ease and access of the upper classes have some inherent justification'". The lower classes may envy the upper classes their material advantages, but they are rarely naive about their source. Language is a virtual repository of forms of deference and power" 0 '.
It is to this problem that we turn now.
Language and Colonial Rule
The complementary problems of language and power are an old married couple in colonial settings. We have no better example of the potency of this connection than Shakespeare's Tempest -where Caliban, seeing the power of Ariel (language), the mistress of his master Prospero, is driven to take possession of her. Caliban took Ariel too literally, however. He failed to realize that language is a form of power only insofar as it can recall and reconstruct a range of experiences that display how one exercises power' 11 Much of the material that followed the first page was written in Swahili. It attempted to strike a rather different chord of the African workers' consciousness. HabariNdugu, which appeared on 29 September 1934, extolled the musical talents of a brass band from Nyasaland (presently Malawi) that was playing in Elisabeth ville at the time. It urged the officers of the workers' lodges and ethnic brotherhoods to encourage their members to come out and see the band and participate in the ngoma or dance competitions (23) . On of East African Swahili. When African workers chose to convey periods when they were at rest or passing time with the Swahili verb 'kushinda', 'to conquer', rather than 'kupumzika' (to relax) or 'kubakia' (to 'while away'), for example, they were making a statement about the combative nature of the work routine. It was not necessarily the impoverished nature of their vocabulary that compelled this choice of words, but the nature of their experiences at work (27) .
African workers were not fooled by the way that their employers and the state chose to negotiate the language problem. They understood their preference to be no more than corporate power turned out in native drag. The industrial employers and the colonial state had in fact given rise to a colonial society that was centered as much on the industrial town as the peasant village. It was a society on the threshold of mass literacy, but in a language other than the native tongue of its ruling class. Like Caliban, African workers were obliged to seize upon the magical powers of language, but for their own purposes and behind the back of the Belgian Prospero (28) . The new laws and ordinances also imposed an even more stringent, cruel and undemocratic dispensation on all Africans living in the towns. What postwar urban reconstruction achieved was less tangible than absolute residential segregation but potentially more important as far as industry's and the town's future were concerned. The new policies gave the colonial administration the means to determine the parameters of the struggle for resources in the towns -after the African masses had been drawn into the competition. But once African workers became attached to the towns, they required a uniform standard of living. Achieving this standard became a perpetual source of conflict among the ethnically diverse African population of Katanga's towns. The colonial administration and private employers ag-gravated the struggle by superimposing a series of insidious but pervasive ethnographic caricatures on urban Africans -the Lamba were lazy and unreliable, the Bemba truculent and inclined to drunkenness, the Lunda secretive and malicious, and so on <38>
A Worker's Tale
. As a result, African industrial workers often envied the lot of African domestic servants who, by virtue of their proximity to Europeans, could acquire enough to eat as well as receive the cast-off garments of their employers. Food and clothing, or the lack thereof, were serious matters for those Africans who decided to remain in the towns (39) .
As African workers began to demand better living and working conditions and higher wages, the Union minière responded with piece rates and other aspects of scientific management in order to constrain their demands' 40 '. The state acted in complementary fashion. However much strategies like those that resulted in the publication of Ngonga mattered to some officials, coercion remained the staple of corporate and colonial policy: corporal punishment was seen as a practical solution to the African workers' restiveness, even though it was illegal after 1922; labor legislation talked of'masters and servants' rather than of employers and workers; trade unions were illegal until the end of the Second World War; and the employers and the state inordinately feared the workers' lodges and friendly societies' 4 ". Work routines were therefore the product of skirmishes between rulers and ruled as well as capitalists and workers. This discontinuity reflected the hegemonic but uneven influence of Katanga's largest employer, the Union minière, over virtually every aspect of civil society and the colonial state (42) . Katanga's industrial revolution involved the creation of an industrial working class without the creation of an industrial society. The Union minière's control over Katanga's provincial government was neither fortuitous nor an 'historical accident' (43) . Its control over the local government was the logical culmination of its social and economic policies; yet the state remained, in some ways, autonomous (44) .
Where the state adopted an authoritarian stance with Africans, it did so less out of reason than fear that it might be out of line with the mining company's wishes. The formation of Katanga's provincial secret police was the quintessential expression of this hit-and-miss policy (45) .
Popular Protest
Much of the explosive character of popular protest in Katanga after the 1930s derived more from the repressive character of the state machinery than the growth of the working class 'per se'. Yet the struggles of Katanga's working class, particularly the mineworkers, galvanized and quickened working-class protest from other quarters of society -to the point that many colonial administrators in Katanga thought that they faced one solitary wave of popular protest between the outset of the Depression and the end of the Second World War. The response of the administration and the big employers to the 1941 strike wave at the Union minière was the most dramatic display of the influence that the provincial secret police had over policy makers in this epoch (46) .
Between 3 and 9 December 1941 a large segment of the African workers at the Union minière's factories and mines in Jadotville and Elisabethville went on strike. Those at the underground Prince Leopold Mine at Kipushi had gone out on strike in November, shortly after an aborted strike by the company's European workers. By the afternoon of 9 December, well over fifteen hundred workers had massed on the soccer field near the '. When police attempted to arrest the more recalcitrant workers, the soldiers plunged into the crowd. At that moment the soldiers manning the machine gun to the extreme left of the soccer field began to fire into the crowd. G. Montenez, a territorial administrator, described the situation on the evening of 9 December in this way: By the end of the strike wave the death toll for African workers was over several hundred. While the white workers and their organization, Association des Agents de l'Union minière or Filiales (AGUFI), had remained aloof from the African strike movement, partly because of coercion and intimidation by both the government and the mining company, many of them came forth to testify about the atrocities they had witnessed during the sessions of the commissions of inquiry that convened after the strike. In several instances white trade union leaders paid dearly for their testimony. Georges Lievens, for instance, was imprisoned under a wartime preventive detention act, blacklisted for employment, and finally deported to Belgium on 31 May 1954 (51) . According to Lievens, the soldiers' attack on the African strikers was not as prudent as Montenez's account suggested. He claimed that the soldiers had been called in to surround the workers' camp as early as the evening of 8 December and that they were charged with insuring that those workers who had joined the strike did not receive rations at 8:00 p.m. that evening. He also claimed that the African machine gunners had not fired into the crowd of strikers on impulse, as Montenez implied, but that they had been ordered to fire on the workers. Fortyeight African strikers were killed initially and another hundred and fifty were wounded, according to Lievens. More died on the following day. Many of those who died from their wounds were women. Shortly after the massacre the mining company built several wings of camp housing over the soccer field to blot any signs of what had happened' 52 '.
If the massacre took place as Lievens claimed, it would mean that the orders to fire on the workers came well in advance of Governor Maron's speech on the playing field -and that Maron himself had issued them. Paradoxically, Lievens's account of the strike's aftermath
How did the series of historic conjunctures that led to indépendance also lead to the repression of popular aspirations and a monstruous dictatorship? (collection B. Matthijs)
paralleled Yav's inasmuch as both of them attributed the massacre at Lubumbashi to Maron. However, in Yav's estimate, Maron's deeds and his ostensible fate -an untimely death in France six years later -were instances of moral entropy, where a ruler who acted without justice and compassion was consumed in a fire of his own making. Having failed to do what he promised, Maron became yet another symbol of colonialism's bad faith. Differences in perception that arise after the fact do not affect the course of events, but they may determine the extent to which one identifies with their consequences. The significance of the African strike movement was not its success or failure, but that it reestablished the boundaries of what was possible in the relations between the workers and the company. Workers suddenly had greater room to maneuver. Although bound by racism and deference, which were reinforced by the colonial legal codes, African workers were, on the other hand, indispensable. And it was this indispensability, placed against a background of deteriorating working conditions and rising prices, that made the implications of the strike so threatening for the long term interests of the company and the colonial government. '
Other groups joined the war of position against the colonial government. Later, as colonial rule came undone, Belgium counted on the ethnically nuanced aspirations of the African working class, particularly in Katanga, and the anti-communism of Great Britain and the United States to keep it in power (56) . But by 1959 -after the riots in Léopoldville, Stanleyville, and the new outbreak of labor unrest in Katanga -Belgian intransigence to the prospect of Congolese independence began to crumble. The indecisiveness of the regime during the urban riots, the visits of the king and Minister of Colonies immediately after the riots, and the accelerated withdrawal of the government's agents from the rural areas all enhanced the colonial government's lack of legitimacy. Once the density of the on-the-ground colonial administration began to thin out, local leaders and parties demanding an immediate end to Belgian rule surfaced in every province of the Congo (37) .
Conclusion
Yav completed the Vocabulaire in 1965, some five years after formal independence and in the midst of a civil war. He wrote it from the vantage point of a domestic servant or 'boy'. Consequently, he was concerned to write an imminently useable history of Elisabeth ville -a primer or handbook -for an urban African posterity in search of employment in uncertain political times. His selection of the crucial happenings of the colonial era was governed by this concern. This is perhaps why independence seemed so "rotten" to him: under the circumstances, the market for domestic servants contracted sharply. 
